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A TALE OF THREE SOVEREIGNS:  THE 
NEBULOUS BOUNDARIES OF THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT, NEW YORK STATE, AND THE 
SENECA NATION OF INDIANS CONCERNING 
STATE TAXATION OF INDIAN RESERVATION 




This Note examines the conflict between New York State and the Seneca 
Nation of Indians regarding the taxation of cigarette sales to non-Indians 
on Indian reservations.  In 1994, the United States Supreme Court found 
New York’s taxation scheme facially permissible without providing 
boundaries or guidance for the state’s subsequent enforcement.  Seventeen 
years after the Court’s decision, no taxes have been collected on these 
sales. 
The issue involves conflicting spheres of federal, state, and tribal control.  
From 1965 to 1994, the Supreme Court balanced these competing interests, 
creating precedent that has failed to provide a definitive solution to this 
crisis.  The Note examines the background of these decisions, the history of 
the treaties between the Seneca tribe and the United States, and the shift in 
federal Indian policy towards promoting a government-to-government 
relationship between the United States government and Indian tribes. 
Lastly, this Note proposes a solution modeled on the example of 
Washington State.  Facing a crisis analogous to that of New York, 
Washington created a lasting solution to its taxation crisis by forging a 
relationship of trust between the state, its agencies, and the Indian tribes.  
This Note advocates that New York follow the same path and create 
cigarette tax compacts between New York and the Indian tribes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On the night of July 16, 1992, tires burned on the New York State 
Thruway, located on a Seneca Indian1 reservation thirty miles south of 
Buffalo, New York.2  Members of the Seneca Nation of Indians protested 
New York State’s imposition of taxes on cigarettes sold to non-Indians on 
reservation lands.3  State troopers intervened, leading to a violent 
confrontation resulting in injury to six people and the arrest of thirteen 
protesters.4
 
 1. This Note uses the terms Indian and Native American interchangeably in accordance 
with contemporary usage. 
 
 2. See infra note 377 and accompanying text. 
 3. See infra note 377 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra note 377 and accompanying text. 
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Less than five years later, on April 21, 1997, the scene was repeated as 
Seneca Indian protestors once again blockaded the New York State 
Thruway on their tribal territory.5  The State once again sent police in riot 
gear and once again the confrontation resulted in injuries on both sides.6
Thirteen years after this encounter, on August 13, 2010, New York City 
Mayor Michael Bloomberg issued the following instructions to Governor 
David Paterson on how to collect taxes from Seneca tobacco sellers:  “I 
said, ‘You know, get yourself a cowboy hat and a shotgun’ . . . . If there’s 
ever a great video, it’s you standing in the middle of the New York State 
Thruway saying . . . ‘Read my lips—the law of the land is this, and we’re 
going to enforce the law.’”
 
7
In response, the Seneca Nation held several rallies on its tribal territory in 
upstate New York protesting the Mayor’s comments and the State’s 
taxation efforts.
 
8  These rallies demonstrated the Senecas’ frustration with 
what they perceived is the State’s infringement upon tribal sovereignty.9  
The words of Tribal Councillor Travis Jimerson reflected the Nation’s 
anger:  “‘They never beat us.  They never removed us . . . . We’re a nation 
that’s never been beat.  Many have tried, and they failed.’”10
In light of the ongoing conflict discussed above, it may be unsurprising to 
learn the United States Supreme Court has weighed in on this issue.  
Indeed, in Department of Taxation & Finance of New York v. Milhelm Attea 
& Bros., Inc.,
 
11 the Court found New York legislation taxing the sale of 
cigarettes to non-Indians on reservations facially permissible in 1994.12  
Almost seventeen years after this decision, however, the bitter conflict 
between the Seneca Nation and New York State continues in the courts and 
in the news.13
From 1965 to 1994, the Supreme Court decided a line of cases 
concerning the intersection between the sovereignty of Indian tribes, federal 
regulation, and the interests of the states.
 
14  Three important factors 
compose the Court’s analysis in these cases.  Part I of this Note explores all 
three.  The first component of this analysis is the development of the 
doctrine of tribal sovereignty, discussed in the first section of Part I.15
 
 5. See infra note 
  
Tribal sovereignty, the autonomy of Indian tribes under American law, 
provides the essential backdrop for discussing the blurry boundaries 
431 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra note 431 and accompanying text. 
 7. Adam Lisberg et al., Bloomberg Tells Paterson To Cowboy Up, Crack Down on 
Senecas Selling Tax-Free Smokes on NY Thruway, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 13, 2010), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/ny_local/2010/08/13/2010-08-13_bloomberg_tells_paterson
_to_cowboy_up_crack_down_on_senecas_selling_taxfree_smok.html#ixzz10DEQetge. 
 8. Dan Herbeck & Aaron Besecker, State Relents After Ruling on Cigarette Tax, 
BUFFALO NEWS (Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.buffalonews.com/city/article178397.ece. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. 512 U.S. 61 (1994). 
 12. See infra Part II.B. 
 13. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 14. See infra Part II.A. 
 15. See infra Part I.A–B. 
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between the state’s power to regulate and the tribe’s freedom from such 
regulation.  Part I then discusses the relevant treaties made between the 
federal government and the Senecas.16  Such treaties also form the basis of 
the rights of Indian tribes and provide the Senecas with an important means 
of challenging New York’s taxation.  Finally, Part I includes the third piece:  
the modern shift in federal Indian policy that began with the New Deal.17
Part II begins by describing the line of Supreme Court cases originating 
with its 1965 decision in Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax 
Commission and culminating with Attea.
  
This policy, which aims to treat Indian tribes as equal partners in the 
decision-making process, promotes government-to-government 
collaboration and respect between the federal government and the Indian 
tribes. 
18  This part demonstrates the 
Court’s reluctance to provide a bright-line boundary between the respective 
realms of the state, the tribe, and the federal government, relying instead on 
a tripartite, ad hoc balancing test.  Part II continues to describe the 
confusion following the Supreme Court’s decision in Attea, a conflict that 
remains unresolved.19  Part II then concludes with a discussion of the 
successful efforts of Washington State to resolve a conflict analogous to 
New York’s conflict.20
Part III looks to these efforts in Washington as a guidepost for resolution 
of the conflict in New York.
 
21
I.  PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER:  TRIBES, TREATIES, AND 
TRANSFORMATION 
  It proposes a solution based on the creation 
of a tribal-state relationship of mutual respect.  It further advocates for 
government-to-government negotiations creating tribal cigarette tax 
compacts similar to those employed in Washington to solve the crisis. 
This part introduces three historical pieces that form the background of 
this issue.  First it explains the development of tribal sovereignty in the first 
years of the United States from the drafting of the Articles of Confederation 
to the acts of the First Congress.22  It then further traces this doctrine to the 
Marshall trilogy, three seminal cases that established tribal sovereignty and 
the basis of federal Indian law for over a century.23  Part I.B explores the 
Senecas’ treaties with the federal government,24 specifically three treaties 
made with the Senecas in the first years of American independence.25
 
 16. See infra Part I.B. 
  Part 
I.B.4 discusses the struggle of the Seneca Indians against the attempts of 
New York State and land speculators to move the tribes off of their 
 17. See infra Part I.C. 
 18. See infra Part II.A–II.B. 
 19. See infra Part II.B.1–2. 
 20. See infra Part II.C. 
 21. See infra Part III. 
 22. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 23. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 24. See infra Part I.B. 
 25. See infra Part I.B.1–3. 
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ancestral homeland to the West.26  It then describes the fraudulent treaty at 
Buffalo Creek and the subsequent compromise treaty that reiterated the 
federal government’s protection of the Seneca Indians from state 
interference.27  Finally, Part I.C describes the ideological transformation in 
federal Indian policy that began with the Indian New Deal and was 
cemented by the promotion of Indian self-determination in the 1960s and 
1970s.28
A.  Tribal Sovereignty:  The Essential Backdrop 
 
This section outlines the development of tribal sovereignty.  It begins 
with an explanation of Indian regulation under the Articles of 
Confederation and later the United States Constitution and the Trade and 
Intercourse Act of 1790.29  It then proceeds to describe the development of 
tribal sovereignty in the three cases forming the Marshall trilogy, which 
provide the essential backdrop to American Indian law.30
1.  Founding Foundations:  From the Articles of Confederation to the Trade 
and Intercourse Act of 1790 
 
The British colonial system in the North American colonies generally 
kept Native American tribes outside of society.31  Neither as wealthy nor as 
politically uniform as Spain, Britain managed its colonies through a more 
decentralized model than its Spanish colonial neighbors.32  Thus, the 
British colonies in North America, which would become the future 
American states, were accustomed to a great deal of autonomy.33  Each 
colony passed its own laws regarding Indian affairs.34  By the time of the 
American Revolution, the British Crown dealt with treaties and land titles 
outside its colonial territory while colonial legislatures handled Indian 
trade.35  Some of the most powerful tribes were those of the Iroquois or 
Haudenosaunee Confederacy:  the Onondagas, the Cayugas, the Oneidas, 
the Mohawks, the Tuscaroras, and the Senecas.36
Thus, the division of powers regarding Indian affairs formed an 




 26. See infra Part I.B.4. 
  
Initially, the Framers drafted the document giving the federal government 
 27. See infra Part I.B.5–6. 
 28. See infra Part I.C.1–2. 
 29. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 30. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 31. See DEBORAH A. ROSEN, AMERICAN INDIANS AND STATE LAW 8 (2007). 
 32. See id. at 8–9. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 9; Robert G. Natelson, The Original Understanding of the Indian Commerce 
Clause, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 201, 219 (2007). 
 35. Natelson, supra note 34, at 219. 
 36. See Robert B. Porter, Legalizing, Decolonizing, and Modernizing New York State’s 
Indian Law, 63 ALB. L. REV. 125, 128 (1999). 
 37. Natelson, supra note 34, at 225. 
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the power to regulate Indian affairs exclusively.38  This sparked debate 
from states like Virginia and South Carolina, which argued that states 
should possess these rights.39
The united states in congress assembled shall have the sole and exclusive 
right and power of . . . regulating the trade and managing all affairs with 
the indians, not members of any of the states, provided that the legislative 
right of any state within its own limits be not infringed or violated . . . .
  The final version of the Articles of 
Confederation contained a vague compromise: 
40
This provision neither defined the limits of state power nor the power of the 
federal government.
 
41  Congress received exclusive jurisdiction over 
transactions with Indians outside U.S. boundaries.42  States received 
exclusive jurisdiction over “Member-Indians,” Indians who were 
“completely subject to state laws.”43  Congress and the states had 
concurrent jurisdiction over transactions with Indians within the United 
States, but congressional action was still subject to state law.44
Thus, the young nation faced its Indian problems with little guidance 
from the Articles of Confederation.  Outstanding war debt crippled the 
country, and popular unrest was a constant threat.
 
45  A solution to this 
rapidly escalating crisis was for Congress to sell western lands to liquidate 
its domestic debt.46  While this plan “might have worked if the region to the 
west of the United States had been empty,”47 several Indian tribes led by 
the Mohawk diplomat Joseph Brant attempted to create an alliance to 
threaten the interests of the Confederation Congress.48  The tribes claimed 
Brant even traveled to London to rekindle their Revolutionary alliance with 
Great Britain, a false rumor that nonetheless struck fear in many 
Americans.49  In addition, tribes in Georgia and North Carolina clashed 
with the states over land claims, leading to unrest.50
In May 1787, the Constitutional Convention convened.
 
51  The serious 
threat of an Indian war placed the regulation of Indian affairs on the agenda 
of the Framers.52
 
 38. ROBERT T. ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW:  CASES AND COMMENTARY 30 
(2008). 
  A summary of the Convention debates shows the 
 39. Id.; Natelson, supra note 34, at 228 (describing South Carolina’s heavy involvement 
in Indian trade regulation prior to the Revolution as the reason for its opposition to federal 
control). 
 40. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, para. 4. 
 41. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 38, at 30–31. 
 42. Natelson, supra note 34, at 230. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See generally WOODY HOLTON, UNRULY AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (2007) (examining how popular movements and protests shaped the adoption 
of the Constitution). 
 46. Id. at 137. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 137–38. 
 49. See id. at 137–40 (describing the entire feigned visit and its consequences). 
 50. Natelson, supra note 34, at 233. 
 51. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 38, at 31. 
 52. Id. 
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delegates’ desire for the states to have subordinate but concurrent authority 
in the sphere of Indian commerce.53  The final product stated that Congress 
has the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations . . . and with 
the Indian Tribes.”54  Whether the Framers intended the word “commerce” 
to signify that congressional power was limited to Indian trade or should be 
interpreted more broadly is the subject of scholarly debate.55
With its newly ratified constitutional mandate, Congress passed the 
Trade and Intercourse Acts (1790 Act) to further regulate trade with Native 
American tribes.
 
56  By delineating the boundaries between American 
settlers and the tribes, Congress hoped to avoid costly Indian wars and 
Indian alliances with European nations, like the partnership threatened by 
Joseph Brant.57  Congress also directed the Acts at states like New York 
that claimed a superior right to control Indian trade.58
The 1790 Act required a federally issued license for private individuals 
who wished to engage in “any trade or intercourse with the Indian tribes.”
 
59  
Section 4 of the Act prohibited the conveyances of Indian land “unless the 
same shall be made and duly executed at some public treaty, held under the 
authority of the United States.”60  Lastly, the Act mandated punishment for 
Americans who commit crimes against Indian tribal members, even if such 
activities are not themselves economic in nature or related to federal 
treaties.61  One-hundred seventy-five years after its passage, Justice Hugo 
Black, writing for the Supreme Court in Warren Trading Post Co. v. 
Arizona Tax Commission,62
 
 53. See Natelson, supra note 34, at 235–41. 
 cited the 1790 Act as the important beginning 
of “comprehensive federal regulation of Indian traders.” 
 54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 55. Compare Natelson, supra note 34, at 241 (arguing this provision of the Constitution 
did not grant exclusive power to Congress and the word “commerce” “meant that Congress 
received power to govern in detail the trade carried on between citizens and tribal Natives 
and those persons involved in that trade”), with Matthew L. M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court 
and the Rule of Law:  Case Studies in Indian Law, 55 FED. LAW. 26, 29 (2008) (arguing the 
Framers intended Congress’s power over Indian affairs “to extend beyond mere 
‘commerce’”), and Robert L. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than 
One, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1342 n.27 (1934) (“The exigencies of the time may have called 
for a more complete system of regulating affairs with the Indians than of controlling 
commerce among the states, but that does not prevent the latter phrase from having an 
equally broad meaning when circumstances demand it.”). 
 56. Act of July 22, 1790, 1 Stat. 137. 
 57. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 38, at 44. 
 58. Porter, supra note 36, at 135. 
 59. Act of July 22, 1790, §§ 1–3, 1 Stat. 137. 
 60. Id. § 4. 
 61. Id. § 5. Compare Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (2010) 
(arguing such a prohibition supports Congress’s Commerce Clause authority to regulate 
nontrade activities to protect its power to regulate Indian commerce), with Robert G. 
Natelson & David Kopel, Commerce in the Commerce Clause:  A Response to Jack Balkin, 
109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 55, 59–60 (2010) (claiming the Indian Intercourse Act 
is not an entirely accurate indicator of the original understanding of the Indian Commerce 
Clause because it was an exercise of federal treaty power rather than commerce power). 
 62. 380 U.S. 685, 688 (1965). 
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2.  The Marshall Trilogy 
The Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Marshall further developed 
the boundaries between state and federal actions in the realm of Indian 
affairs.  In the first decades of the nineteenth century, the Court decided a 
trio of cases:  Johnson v. M’Intosh,63 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,64 and 
Worcester v. Georgia.65  These cases, known as the “Marshall trilogy,” 
serve as the earliest foundation of federal Indian law, forming the backdrop 
against which modern issues affecting tribal sovereignty are analyzed.66
In Johnson, the Court ruled that conveyances of land titles from tribal 
Indians to non-Indian private individuals were not entitled to recognition by 
the United States.
 
67  Chief Justice Marshall held that the federal 
government possessed “an exclusive right to extinguish Indian title of 
occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest.”68  When Great Britain 
established colonies in the American territory, it gained “the exclusive right 
of the discoverer to appropriate the lands occupied by the Indians.”69  The 
United States inherited the traditional rights of the European discoverer 
when it signed the Treaty of Paris in 1783, ending the American 
Revolutionary War.70
In Cherokee Nation, the Court confronted one of the first cases in which 
an Indian tribe was actively involved in challenging the policy of a state.
  This landmark ruling marked one of the first 
important Supreme Court articulations about federal power over title to 
Indian land. 
71  
There, the Cherokee nation sought to enjoin the State of Georgia from 
implementing laws “which, as is alleged, go directly to annihilate the 
Cherokee as a political society.”72
 
 63. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
  Thus, the dispositive issue Chief Justice 
Marshall addressed was whether the Cherokee tribe, as an allegedly foreign 
 64. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
 65. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
 66. See McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 168–73 (1973); 
Matthew L. M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Indian Problem, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 592–
93 (2008) (citing the Marshall trilogy as the “template for analyzing and interpreting the law 
in relation to disputes between the [federal, state, and tribal] sovereigns”); L. Scott Gould, 
The Consent Paradigm:  Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 816 
(1996) (noting the Marshall trilogy forms “[t]he conceptual underpinnings of and initial 
limitations on” Indian sovereignty). 
 67. 21 U.S. at 587; see Gould, supra note 66, at 816. 
 68. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 587.  The Chief Justice’s analysis was strongly influenced by a 
particularly English theory of customary law which submitted that “custom evidenced 
ancient and lost legislative will.” Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency:  Johnson v. 
M’Intosh and the Expropriation of American Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1065, 1098–
99 (2000). 
 69. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 584. 
 70. Id. at 584–85. 
 71. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); see ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 38, at 53. 
 72. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 15.  Georgia began enacting a series of legislative acts 
beginning in 1827 which gave Georgia the ultimate title to Cherokee lands, forcing 
dissolution of tribal autonomous governments and pressuring Indians to leave the state. See, 
e.g., Act of Dec. 19, 1827, ch. 1, 1827 Ga. Laws 236 (asserting Georgia’s title to Cherokee 
lands); ROSEN, supra note 31, at 39. 
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nation, could invoke the Court’s original jurisdiction over suits between 
foreign states and American states.73  He began his analysis by stating that 
“[t]he condition of the Indians in relation to the United States is, perhaps, 
unlike that of any other two people in existence.”74  Rather than a foreign 
state as intended by the Constitution, Marshall concluded that Indian tribes 
“may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent 
nations.”75  The relationship between the United States and Native 
American tribes “resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”76  Thus the 
Court ruled that the Cherokee could not maintain an action invoking the 
Court’s original jurisdiction, instead placing Indian tribes as the 
beneficiaries of a trust relationship with the federal government.77
The dispute between the Cherokee and Georgia continued in 
Worcester.
 
78  Georgia charged plaintiff Samuel Worcester, a white 
Christian missionary, with living “within the limits of the Cherokee nation 
without a license” and without swearing his allegiance to Georgia and 
Georgian law.79  As Chief Justice Marshall explained, “The extra-territorial 
power of every legislature being limited in its action to its own citizens or 
subjects, the very passage of this act is an assertion of jurisdiction over the 
Cherokee nation, and of the rights and powers consequent thereto.”80  The 
Court held that the Georgia law was an unconstitutional interference “with 
the relations established between the United States and the Cherokee nation, 
the regulation of which, according to the settled principles of our 
Constitution, is committed exclusively to the government of the Union.”81
In an opinion considered one of the most important in American Indian 
jurisprudence, the Court held that Georgia impermissibly extended its laws 
over Cherokee territory and refuted Georgia’s theoretical justifications for 
 
 
 73. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 15–16; see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial 
Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws 
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; to all 
Cases . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”); 
Judiciary Act of 1789, § 13, 1 Stat. 73 (“[T]he Supreme Court shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction of all controversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party, except . . . between 
a state and . . . aliens, in which latter case it shall have original but not exclusive 
jurisdiction.”). 
 74. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16. 
 75. Id. at 17. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. (“They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its 
power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the president as their great father.”); 
ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 38, at 61 (noting Cherokee Nation “is generally considered to 
be the origin of the trust relationship in Federal Indian Law, under which the federal 
government is considered the trustee of Indian tribes”); see also Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 
21 (Johnson, J., concurring) (“I cannot but think there are strong reasons for doubting the 
applicability of the epithet ‘state,’ to a people so low in the grade of organized society as our 
Indian tribes most generally are.”). 
 78. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 515 (1832). 
 79. Id. at 528. 
 80. Id. at 516. 
 81. Id. at 520. 
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such regulation.82  The Court recognized the principle of tribal sovereignty, 
firmly within the sphere of federal regulation, as a check on state control.83  
Worcester first articulated the policy, later “deeply rooted in the Nation’s 
history” that “state law could have no role to play within the reservation 
boundaries.”84  Although American Indian jurisprudence has moved away 
from the holding in Worcester, the case remains a relevant, but not 
conclusive, method to measure the question of a state’s interference into 
Indian affairs.85
Congress reaffirmed the Marshall trilogy’s assertions of federal authority 
over Indian affairs fifty years later when it passed the Major Crimes Act of 
1885.
 
86  The statute placed within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal 
government prosecution for felonies such as murder, assault, arson, 
burglary, or robbery committed by an Indian against another Indian on 
reservation territory.87  The Supreme Court affirmed the validity of the 
statute in United States v. Kagama.88  There, Justice Samuel Freeman 
Miller stated that the Act was necessary for the protection of the weak and 
subjugated Indian tribes.89
 
 82. See id.; ROSEN, supra note 31, at 45.  Georgia initially refused to abide by the 
Supreme Court’s decision, but eventually freed the missionaries. ANDERSON ET AL., supra 
note 38, at 74–75.  The apparent victory in Worcester, however, did not prevent the removal 
of Indian tribes from their eastern lands to lands in the west.  When President Andrew 
Jackson was elected in 1828, he advocated legislation removing Indian tribes from their 
coveted eastern lands. Id. at 52; see also ROSEN, supra note 31, at 38–39 (noting Cherokee 
territory became particularly valuable to white settlers when gold was discovered there in the 
1820s).  Under Jackson’s guidance, Congress passed the Indian Removal Act, 4 Stat. 411 
(1830).  The statute authorized the President to provide “so much of any territory belonging 
to the United States, west of the river Mississippi” to Indian tribes in exchange for the lands 
on which currently resided. Id. at 411–12.  As a result, the vast majority of Indian tribes were 
forced to move across the Mississippi between 1820 and 1850, including the Cherokee in the 
infamous “Trail of Tears.” See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 38, at 75; Gould, supra note 66, 
at 819. 
  More importantly, the federal government had 
jurisdiction over such acts “because it never has existed anywhere else, 
because the theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the 
United States, because it has never been denied, and because it alone can 
 83. See Hope M. Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision of “Domestic Dependent 
Nations” in the Twenty-First Century:  Tribal Sovereignty Re-envisioned, Reinvigorated, 
and Re-empowered, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 443, 481. 
 84. McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 168 (1973) (citing Rice v. 
Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945)). 
 85. Id. at 172; see White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141–42 
(1980) (noting the Court departed from Worcester “[l]ong ago,” but Indian tribes still retain 
attributes of sovereignty); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219–20 (1959) (“Over the years 
this Court has modified these principles . . . but the basic policy of Worcester has 
remained.”); Ann E. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots Between the Constitution, the Marshall 
Trilogy and United States v. Lara:  Notes Toward a Blueprint for the Next Legislative 
Restoration of Tribal Sovereignty, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 651, 673–74 (2009) (noting 
Worcester is additionally important for the historical understanding of the status of Indian 
tribes’ sovereignty in the first decades after the founding and the limitations it placed on 
state power).  
 86. ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006)). 
 87. See id. 
 88. 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
 89. Id. at 384. 
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enforce its laws on all the tribes.”90  Congress thus had plenary authority 
over Indian tribes.91  The Court affirmed the role of the federal government 
as a paternal, civilizing force justified in “protecting” Indian tribes, 
reiterating the trust relationship first articulated in Cherokee Nation.92
B.  A History of Distrust:  The Seneca Treaties 
 
This section discusses the treaties between the United States and the 
Seneca Indians.  It first describes the initial treaties of the Senecas with the 
infant United States.93  It then describes the attempts of New York State to 
push out the Senecas and the other Iroquois tribes in the antebellum years of 
the nineteenth century.94  It then describes the controversy surrounding the 
Buffalo Creek treaty and the subsequent compromise treaty to assure the 
tribes of the goodwill of the federal government.95
As modern Indian jurisprudence has moved away from Worcester’s 
sovereignty paradigm as a bar to state intervention, “the trend has been . . . 
toward reliance on federal pre-emption.”
 
96  State regulation is preempted 
when the federal government has established comprehensive statutes and 
regulations, including treaties.97  As Justice Thurgood Marshall noted in 
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, “modern cases thus tend to 
avoid reliance on platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and to look instead 
to the applicable treaties and statutes which define the limits of state 
power.”98  In Attea, the Seneca Nation submitted an amicus brief arguing 
that New York’s tax scheme violated federal treaties which they claim 
prohibit New York from taxing transactions occurring on tribal land.99  
Because the New York Court of Appeals did not address these treaty 
claims, the Supreme Court stated they were not properly brought before the 
Court and accordingly did not decide the merits of the Senecas’ treaty 
claims.100
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on its merits, the Seneca 
Nation’s treaty claims form an important part of its opposition to New 
York’s tax scheme.  Because they have not yet litigated their treaty rights, 
 
 
 90. Id. at 384–85. 
 91. Id.; Alex Tallchief Skibine, Redefining the Status of Indian Tribes Within “Our 
Federalism”:  Beyond the Dependency Paradigm, 38 CONN. L. REV. 667, 674 (2006) (stating 
Kagama articulated the plenary power of Congress over Indian tribes even within the state 
where the Indian reservations were located). 
 92. See supra note 77 and accompanying text; see also Gould, supra note 66, at 827–28; 
Skibine, supra note 91, at 675 (noting Kagama reiterated the “guardian-ward paradigm” of 
Cherokee Nation to justify the federal government’s authority over Indian tribes). 
 93. See infra Part I.B.1–3. 
 94. See infra Part I.B.4. 
 95. See infra Part I.B.5–6. 
 96. McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973). 
 97. See Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685, 690 (1965). 
 98. 411 U.S. at 172. 
 99. Dep’t. of Taxation and Fin. of N.Y. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 61, 77 n.11 
(1994) (“We do not address this contention, which differs markedly from respondent’s 
position and which was not addressed by the Court of Appeals.”). 
 100. Id. 
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the Senecas argue that courts have failed “to address the uniqueness of [the 
Senecas’] situation.”101  Indeed, Felix S. Cohen, a preeminent Indian law 
scholar and architect of the Indian New Deal, stated that the treaties of the 
tribes of New York give them “a peculiar status.”102
1.  Fort Stanwix Treaty (1784) 
 
Soon after the American Revolution, New York forced the Confederated 
Congress to address the balance between federal and state jurisdiction in 
Indian affairs.103  Congress challenged New York’s desire to use Iroquois 
land for military bounty lands.104  New York Governor George Clinton 
refused to cooperate with the federal government on Indian affairs.105  The 
federal government thus tried to resolve the issue by negotiating a treaty 
with the Senecas, Mohawks, Onondagas, and Cayugas in 1784, the Treaty 
of Fort Stanwix.106  While the federal and the Indian representatives 
negotiated, the federal government posted sentries to keep New York State 
Indian Commissioners from interfering with the negotiations.107  The 
Treaty drew a line forming the western boundary of Iroquois territory.108  
The Iroquois gave up its claims to the western lands of Ohio and, in return, 
they were “secured in the peaceful possession of the lands they inhabit east 
and north of the same.”109  The federal government agreed to protect the 
lands of the tribes; however, the State was determined to undermine the 
efforts of the federal government to prevent white settlement 
encroachment.110  Even after the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, New York 
encouraged settlers to migrate to Indian lands and continued to engage in 
sales with Indian nations for their lands, often reselling it to white settlers 
for a significant profit.111
2.  Fort Harmar Treaty (1789) 
 
Far from appeasing the Iroquois, many tribal leaders viewed the large 
land concessions of the Treaty of Fort Stanwix as a humiliating 
 
 101. Testimony of J.C. Seneca, Co-Chair of the Seneca Nation of Indians Foreign 
Relations Comm. Before the S. Comm. on Investigations and Gov’t Operations, 2009–2010 
Sess. 8 (N.Y. 2009) [hereinafter Testimony of J.C. Seneca].  
 102. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 416 (1942). 
 103. See LAURENCE M. HAUPTMAN, CONSPIRACY OF INTERESTS:  IROQUOIS DISPOSSESSION 
AND THE RISE OF NEW YORK STATE 63 (1999). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Treaty with the Six Nations, Oct. 22, 1784, 7 Stat. 15; HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, 
at 63. 
 107. BARBARA GRAYMONT, THE IROQUOIS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 279 (1971) 
(describing the federal government’s fear that the uncooperative New York agents would 
attempt to bribe tribal representatives with liquor); HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 63. 
 108. Treaty with the Six Nations, Oct. 22, 1784, art. III, 7 Stat. 15. 
 109. Id. 
 110. HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 63–64. 
 111. Id. at 64 (noting “[l]and ‘purchased’ by state ‘treaty’ from Oneidas for fifty cents an 
acre was sold for seven to ten times its original purchasing price”). 
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frustration.112  Widespread sickness and factionalism among the tribes 
prevented the treaty from gaining the legitimacy it needed to effectively 
establish peace.113  Five years later, U.S. commissioners met with the 
Iroquois tribes again and created the Treaty of Fort Harmar.114  The treaty 
reaffirmed the boundary line created by the Fort Stanwix treaty.115  The 
treaty additionally confirmed that the United States would relinquish its 
claims to Iroquois land “lying east and north of the beforementioned 
boundary line.”116  The treaty also proclaimed that the “peace and 
friendship” articulated in the Fort Stanwix treaty would be “perpetual.”117  
Just as the text of the Treaty of Fort Harmar mirrored its predecessor at Fort 
Stanwix, the treaty was similarly met with controversy by the tribes.118
3.  Canandaigua Treaty (1794) 
 
The United States and the Iroquois tribes met again in 1794 to create a 
treaty which would finally end the unrest of the western Indian wars.119  
The product of these meetings remains the most important treaty regarding 
Iroquois sovereignty.120  Called the Canandaigua Treaty, or sometimes the 
Pickering Treaty (after U.S. Commissioner Thomas Pickering), the parties 
signed the treaty on November 11, 1794.121  The treaty recognized the lands 
of the Iroquois and promised “the United States will never claim the same, 
nor disturb them or either of the Six [Iroquois] Nations . . . in the free use 
and enjoyment thereof:  but the said reservations shall remain theirs, until 
they choose to sell the same to the people of the United States, who have 
the right to purchase.”122
The Senecas claim this language established a jurisdictional boundary 
assuring “no other government has the right to interfere in how [the 
Senecas] use those lands without [the Senecas’] consent” and that “New 





 112. GRAYMONT, supra note 107, at 16–17 (noting “the Indians were extremely frustrated 
in their attempts to secure a written copy of the American commissioners’ speeches and the 
treaty”); HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 168 (noting the “humiliation” of the Indian nations 
at Fort Stanwix). 
  The treaty also redrew the lines of the Senecas’ western borders, 
returning to them lands relinquished in the 1784 and 1789 treaties in 
 113. GRAYMONT, supra note 107, at 278. 
 114. Treaty with the Six Nations, Jan. 9, 1789, 7 Stat. 33. 
 115. Id. art. 1 (stating that the nations agreed “to renew and confirm all the engagements 
and stipulations entered into at the beforementioned treaty at fort Stanwix”). 
 116. Id. art. 2. 
 117. Id. art. 4. 
 118. Barbara Alice Mann, The Greenville Treaty of 1795:  Pen-and-Ink Witchcraft in the 
Struggle for the Old Northwest, in ENDURING LEGACIES:  NATIVE AMERICAN TREATIES AND 
CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES 135, 162 (Bruce Elliott Johansen ed., 2004) (describing 
how native sources and traditions question the legitimacy of the Fort Harmar tribal leaders’ 
mandate to make such an agreement). 
 119. COHEN, supra note 102, at 419. 
 120. HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 90. 
 121. Treaty with the Six Nations, Nov. 11, 1794, 7 Stat. 44. 
 122. Id. art. 2. 
 123. Testimony of J.C. Seneca, supra note 101, at 6–7. 
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exchange for the tribes’ recognition of the U.S. claims in the Ohio territory, 
west of American borders.124
In its immediate aftermath, the Treaty of Canandaigua cemented the 
termination of violent conflict between the United States and the Indian 
tribes on its western frontier.
 
125  The Seneca viewed the treaty as the federal 
government’s affirmation of Seneca tribal sovereignty and as a pact among 
equals.126  From a long-term perspective, this treaty, in conjunction with the 
Treaty of Fort Stanwix and the Treaty of Fort Harmar, “had the effect of 
placing the tribes and their reservation beyond the operation and effect of 
general state laws.”127
4.  The Senecas’ Fight Against Removal 
 
Despite this trilogy of treaties, the Senecas were not long at peace.  Like 
many of his contemporaries, New York Governor De Witt Clinton believed 
Indian tribes were destined for extinction.128  Thus, the solution to New 
York’s Indian problems became removal to the west.129  Clinton and others 
saw the native lands of central and western New York as lands of bountiful 
opportunity not only for agriculture and natural resources, but more 
importantly for trade and transportation.130  Indeed, the “transportation 
revolution” wrought by the completion of the Erie Canal would bring 
fortune to the non-Indian settlers of Western New York but lead “to the 
undoing of the Iroquois.”131
New York also began to assert criminal jurisdiction over crimes 
committed by Indians against other Indians.  In 1822, a Seneca council 
condemned a Seneca woman to death for witchcraft.
 
132  Tommy Jemmy 
executed the woman, and he was arrested by the New York authorities and 
convicted of murder.133  Jemmy challenged the conviction, arguing that he 
was carrying out the legally valid judgment of the tribal court.134  The New 
York Court for the Correction of Errors rejected this argument and held 
state law supreme over Jemmy’s actions.135
 
 124. Treaty with the Six Nations, Nov. 11, 1794, arts. III–IV, 7 Stat. 44; COHEN, supra 
note 102, at 419; HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 90 (describing the federal receding of land 
to the Seneca and the Seneca recognition of federal land claims in the west as “remarkable”). 
  The New York state legislature 
 125. Jack Campisi & William A. Starna, On the Road to Canandaigua:  The Treaty of 
1794, 19 AM. INDIAN Q. 467, 467 (1995) (stating the treaty “ended a turbulent period of 
enmity that had threatened to engulf the fledgling United States in what would have been a 
destructive Indian war”); see also HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 90 (noting the treaty 
“resolved longstanding issues that had never been resolved between the Iroquois, most 
notably the Seneca, and the federal government at the end of the American Revolution”).  
 126. HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 90. 
 127. COHEN, supra note 102, at 419. 
 128. Vivian C. Hopkins, De Witt Clinton and the Iroquois, 8 ETHNOHISTORY 213, 214 
(1961). 
 129. Id.; see supra note 82. 
 130. See HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 17. 
 131. Id. at 3. 
 132. Hatch v. Luckman, 118 N.Y.S. 689, 694–95 (Sup. Ct. 1909). 
 133. Id. at 695. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
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responded by passing an act which declared “the . . . exclusive jurisdiction 
of trying and punishing all and every person, of whatsoever nation or tribe, 
for crimes and offenses committed within any part of the state . . . was 
exclusively vested in the courts of justice of this state.”136  After asserting 
their jurisdiction over such crimes, the legislature pardoned Tommy 
Jemmy.137
New York courts also asserted New York State’s place in Indian affairs 
in Murray v. Wooden,
 
138 deciding the validity of an Oneida Indian’s land 
deed from 1809.  The Supreme Court of Judicature ruled that the U.S. 
Constitution’s Indian Commerce Clause did not extend to an individual’s 
disposition of Indian lands.139  Since the Constitution did not cover such 
transactions, the court concluded that the Tenth Amendment reserved the 
power to the states.140  Because New York law at the time of the 
conveyance of the deed permitted the transaction, the court upheld the 
validity of the deed despite federal prohibition of Indian land 
conveyances.141
The construction of the Erie Canal made Buffalo one of the largest cities 
in the United States in the first half of the nineteenth century.
  Thus, in the decades following the Treaty of Canandaigua, 
New York began to assert its authority over the Indian tribes more 
aggressively despite the presence of federal treaties ostensibly protecting 
tribes from such intrusion. 
142  The city 
bordered the Seneca Buffalo Creek Reservation, and the city’s expansion 
depended on the extinguishment of this Indian territory to open land to 
Buffalo’s increasing white population.143  Land speculators bought the land 
bordering the reservation and even lobbied the President of the United 
States for Seneca removal.144
In 1823, President James Monroe’s Secretary of War John C. Calhoun 
allowed the Ogden Land Company, a powerful group of politically 
connected land speculators, to conduct a preliminary survey of the Buffalo 
Creek lands.
 
145  The Senecas, however, withstood the company’s and New 
York’s pressure to sell their lands.146
 
 136. Act of Apr. 12, 1822, ch. 204, 1822 N.Y. Laws 202; see Hatch, 118 N.Y.S. at 695. 
  The federal government appointed 
 137. Hatch, 118 N.Y.S. at 695. 
 138. 17 Wend. 531, 531 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837). 
 139. Id. at 537–38 (stating “there is some difficulty in perceiving how the clause can be 
construed as applying to the disposition of Indian lands . . . . It would seem to be carrying the 
power simply ‘to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes,’ to an extent beyond the 
legitimate and common meaning of the terms themselves”); see Deborah A. Rosen, 
Colonization Through Law:  The Judicial Defense of State Indian Legislation, 1790–1880, 
46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 26, 39 (2004). 
 140. See Murray, 17 Wend. at 538. 
 141. See id. at 539–40. 
 142. HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 101. 
 143. Id. at 101–02; see also id. at 161 (describing the antebellum population boom of 
white settlers in western New York); Hopkins, supra note 128, at 216 (stating that Governor 
Clinton believed the “only solution for the problem of New York Indians” was removal of 
the tribes to the west). 
 144. HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 114–15. 
 145. Id. at 119. 
 146. Id. at 148. 
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Oliver Forward, a local judge, to deal with the Senecas.147  On August 31, 
1826, the Senecas, through several interpreters, came to an agreement with 
the Ogden Land Company in a controversial treaty brokered under the 
authority of the United States through Forward.148  The treaty reduced 
Seneca land by approximately 87,000 acres.149  The tribe ceded several 
reservations and reduced the Buffalo Creek, Tonawanda, and Cattaraugus 
reservations as well.150
The Senecas questioned the legality of the treaty almost immediately.  
The U.S. Senate never ratified the treaty and most Senecas opposed it.
 
151  
Forward allegedly received money from the managers of the Ogden Land 
Company, and some of the Seneca chiefs were apparently bribed.152  
Forward received such extensive criticism that he wrote to President John 
Quincy Adams to justify his actions, stating that all the Seneca chiefs were 
fully knowledgeable of all the proposals and voluntarily agreed to sell the 
lands.153
Seneca leader Red Jacket and his followers appealed directly to President 
Adams, emphasizing the significant Seneca opposition to the treaty.
 
154  
They stated that Forward only gave the Senecas two days to decide to sell 
the land, and they were threatened with being driven off their land by the 
federal government.155  Red Jacket and two other Seneca Indians met with 
President Adams on March 24, 1828.156  They urged the President to 
investigate their fraud allegations and asked that the Seneca not be removed 
to Wisconsin.157  After debate, the Senate failed to ratify the treaty.158  The 
Senate then issued a resolution stating that its failure to ratify the treaty did 
not necessarily signify its disapproval of the contract’s terms.159
The President, however, swayed by the anti-treaty arguments, appointed 




 147. N.Y. STATE ASSEMB., REP. OF SPEC. COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE INDIAN PROBLEM OF 
THE STATE OF N.Y., 1888-51, 1888 Sess., at 23 (1888) [hereinafter WHIPPLE REPORT]; 
HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 153.  
  
Livingston’s report revealed that fraud surrounded the signing of the 
 148. See Seneca Nation v. Christy, 162 U.S. 283, 285 (1896) (“By a treaty and 
conveyance on that day the Seneca Nation, by its sachems, chiefs and warriors, in the 
presence of a . . . commissioner appointed by the United States, conveyed a tract of eighty-
seven thousand acres of [its] lands . . . for the consideration of $48,216, acknowledged by 
the deed to have been in hand and paid.”); HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 154. 
 149. Christy, 162 U.S. at 285; HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 154–55. 
 150. WHIPPLE REPORT, supra note 147 at 23; HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 154–55. 
 151. Christy, 162 U.S. at 285–86; WHIPPLE REPORT, supra note 147, at 23; HAUPTMAN, 
supra note 103, at 154–55. 
 152. HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 154–55. 
 153. Id. at 155–56. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 157. 
 156. Id. at 158. See generally Granville Ganter, Red Jacket and the Decolonization of 
Republican Virtue, 31 AM. INDIAN Q. 559, 564 (2007). 
 157. HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 158. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 159. 
 160. Id; see Ganter, supra note 156, at 571.  
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controversial treaty.161  Livingston said Seneca chiefs were not willing to 
sell their land until ten days after the treaty council.162  Livingston found 
that the Ogden Land Company paid the interpreters “to ‘influence’ the 
Seneca to extinguish their title.”163  Livingston also stated that the chiefs 
were under duress due to threats of forcible removal.164  He suggested that 
Forward and the Ogden Land Company met surreptitiously before the treaty 
council and that many chiefs were financially dependent on federal 
annuities.165  Livingston’s largely negative report prevented the 1826 treaty 
from resubmission to the Senate.166
5.  Buffalo Creek Treaty Controversy 
 
On January 15, 1838 the federal government concluded another treaty 
with the New York Indians providing lands for the tribes in Kansas.167  The 
treaty also apportioned funds for the removal and resettlement of the 
tribes.168  The Senecas, still disputing the Ogden Land Company’s deed, 
refused to leave their reservations or move to Kansas.169  The federal 
government had no desire to forcibly remove the Senecas.170
6.  Buffalo Creek Compromise Treaty (1842) 
 
In response to the overwhelming accusations of fraud and deceit and the 
Senecas’ refusal to move west, the U.S. government negotiated a new 
“compromise treaty” with the Senecas at Buffalo Creek, which the U.S. 
Senate ratified in 1842.171  The new treaty returned the Allegany and 
Cattaraugus reservations to the Senecas, but not the Buffalo Creek and 
Tonawanda reservations.172  The treaty also stated that the United States 
would “protect . . . the lands of the Seneca Indians, within the State of New 
York . . . from all taxes, and assessments for roads, highways, or any other 
purpose.”173
 
 161. HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 159. 
  As a result of the political fracturing emanating from the 
 162. Id. at 159–60. 
 163. Id; see Ganter, supra note 156, at 570. 
 164. HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 159–60.  There were also allegations that the chiefs 
had been bribed with liquor. COHEN, supra note 102, at 420. 
 165. HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 160. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Treaty with the Six Nations, Jan. 15, 1838, 7 Stat. 550; see COHEN, supra note 102, 
at 420. 
 168. Treaty with the Six Nations, Jan. 15, 1838, 7 Stat. 550; see COHEN, supra note 102, 
at 420. 
 169. COHEN, supra note 102, at 420. 
 170. Id. (noting the government did not want to repeat the Trail of Tears). 
 171. Treaty with the Senecas, May 20, 1842, 7 Stat. 586; see HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, 
at 191. 
 172. HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 177. 
 173. Treaty with the Senecas, May 20, 1842, art. IX, 7 Stat. 586. 
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controversy, the Senecas created an independent constitutional government, 
the Seneca Nation of Indians, in 1848.174
By the last years of the nineteenth century, the U.S. government removed 
many eastern Indian tribes to western territories.
 
175  The Seneca Nation, 
however, was an exception, which created problems for New York State.176  
In In re The New York Indians,177 the Supreme Court held that the New 
York State legislation taxing Seneca reservations violated federal treaties, 
reversing a decision of the New York Court of Appeals.  The Supreme 
Court examined New York legislation passed in 1841 during the Buffalo 
Creek controversy when removal of the Senecas seemed imminent.178  
However, the legislation contained the provision that “the failure to 
extinguish the right of the Indians . . . shall not impair the validity of said 
taxes, or prevent the collection thereof.”179  The Court regarded this 
provision as “a very free, if not extraordinary, exercise of power over these 
reservations and the rights of Indians, so long possessed and so frequently 
guaranteed by treaties.”180
The Court began its analysis by looking to federal treaties, stating that 
“the rights of Indians do not depend on this or any other statutes of the 
State, but upon treaties, which are the supreme law of the land.”
 
181  
Reiterating the text of the Treaty of Canandaigua, the Court affirmed the 
federal government’s acknowledgment that the reservations are the property 
of the Senecas.182  Such an acknowledgment signified that the Indians 
“were entitled to the undisturbed enjoyment” of their “ancient possessions 
and occupancy” unless removed by the federal government.183
The Court denied the State’s power to tax these lands.
 
184  “Until the 
Indians have sold their lands, and removed from them in pursuance of the 
treaty stipulations,” they retain their original rights articulated in the federal 
treaties.185  Taxing these lands before removal was thus “premature and 
illegal.”186
 
 174. HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 12; Testimony of J.C. Seneca, supra note 
  The Court described the reservations as “wholly exempt from 
State taxation,” and thus New York’s tax was “an unwarrantable 
interference, inconsistent with the original title of the Indians, and offensive 
101, at 5; 
Porter, supra note 36, at 137–38 (emphasizing the role of New York state pressure in the 
“Seneca Revolution” resulting in a constitutional republic). 
 175. ROSEN, supra note 31, at 76. 
 176. See id. at 79. 
 177. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761, 771–72 (1866). 
 178. Id. at 768 (“This explanation . . . removes the inference that might otherwise be 
drawn, that the legislature were encouraging . . . a direct interference by the owners of the 
right of pre-emption with these ancient possessions and occupations, secured by the most 
sacred of obligations of the Federal government.”); COHEN, supra note 102, at 420. 
 179. In re The New York Indians, 72 U.S. at 764 (emphasis omitted). 
 180. Id. at 766. 
 181. Id. at 768. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 770. 
 184. Id. at 769 (citing In re The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866)). 
 185. Id. at 770. 
 186. Id. 
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to their tribal relations.”187  Because the Senecas’ treaty rights remained 
intact, the federal government had exclusive control.188
C.  Modern Federal Indian Policy:  A Government-to-Government 
Approach 
 
This section outlines the shift in federal Indian policy toward establishing 
government-to-government relationships with Indian tribes.  It begins by 
outlining the origins of this policy with the politics of the New Deal.189  
This section then proceeds to discuss how this policy became cemented in 
the 1960s and 1970s through the promotion of Indian self-determination.190  
The advocacy of government-to-government dealings not only forms the 
starting point of federal Indian regulation, but it is also a potential model for 
resolving the conflict between New York and the Indian tribes.191
1.  The Indian New Deal 
 
The election of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt led to a profound 
shift in federal Indian policy.192  The focus moved from Indian assimilation 
into white American culture to an emphasis on the development of tribal 
economies and governments.193  Indians had not abandoned their tribal 
culture as the assimilationists hoped.194  Also, Congress disapproved of the 
tremendous amount of federal funds being diverted to expansive 
governmental regulation of Indian tribes.195  Led by Commissioner of the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs John Collier and legal scholar Felix S. Cohen, this 
“new deal” aimed at preventing the loss of Indian land and providing 
statutory support for Indian self-government.196
Congress encapsulated the Roosevelt administration’s Indian policy in 
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA).
 
197  The Act ended the 
allotment of Indian reservation land to individual Indians198
 
 187. Id. at 771. 
 and authorized 
the Secretary of the Interior to return to tribal governance surplus land that 
 188. See id.; see also McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 169 (1973) 
(noting that the Court “unambiguously rejected state efforts to impose a land tax on 
reservation Indians”). 
 189. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 190. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 191. See infra Part III. 
 192. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 38, at 130; see Gould, supra note 66, at 832. 
 193. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 38, at 128. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Patrice H. Kunesh, Constant Governments:  Tribal Resilience and Regeneration in 
Changing Times, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 8, 18 (2009); G. William Rice, The Indian 
Reorganization Act, the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and a Proposed 
Carcieri “Fix”:  Updating the Trust Land Acquisition Process, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 575, 578 
(2009).  
 197. Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–79 
(2006)). 
 198. 25 U.S.C § 461. 
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had not yet been open to non-Indians.199  The Act also mandated that 
Indians receive a preference for job openings in the Indian office.200  Indian 
chartered corporations could receive loans from the federal government “for 
the purpose of promoting the economic development of such tribes and of 
their members.”201  Indian tribes would be authorized to adopt a tribal 
constitution and bylaws for self-governance.202  Furthermore, the Act 
would not apply to reservations where a majority of Indian adults voted 
against its application.203  Thus, with the IRA, Congress attempted to return 
to the tribes some self-regulatory agency and promote a “government-to-
government” approach to the relationship between the United States and the 
tribes.204
The Indian New Deal policies also produced the Indian Claims 
Commission Act of 1946 (ICCA).
 
205  The Act created a Commission which 
acted as a tribunal to adjudicate claims against the United States on behalf 
of Indian tribes.206  Permissible claims against the United States under the 
statute were constitutional claims, tort claims otherwise permissible against 
the United States, treaty or contract claims “on the ground of fraud, duress, 
unconscionable consideration, mutual or unilateral mistake,” land takings 
claims, and claims “based upon fair and honorable dealings that are not 
recognized by any existing rule of law or equity.”207  The architects of the 
Act intended to create a venue to correct past injustices.208
2.  Indian Self-Determination 
 
The Indian New Deal ideas about tribal self-government, unpopular 
during World War II and the 1950s,209 re-emerged with the election of 
President John F. Kennedy, who promised to protect tribal land rights and 
to encourage Indian political participation.210
 
 199. Id. § 463(a); see Gould, supra note 66, at 832. 
  President Lyndon B. 
 200. 25 U.S.C § 472. 
 201. Id. § 470. 
 202. Id. § 476(a). 
 203. Id. § 478.  The Iroquois Six Nations were some of the most prominent tribes to reject 
the Act. See generally LAURENCE M. HAUPTMAN, THE IROQUOIS & THE NEW DEAL (1981). 
 204. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 
134, 155 (1980) (stating the IRA evidences “a congressional concern with fostering tribal 
self-government and economic development”); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 
145, 152 (1973) (“The intent and purpose of the Reorganization Act was ‘to rehabilitate the 
Indian’s economic life and to give him a chance to develop the initiative destroyed by a 
century of oppression and paternalism.’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1804, at 6 (1934))); 
Skibine, supra note 91, at 675. 
 205. Pub. L. No. 79-726, 60 Stat. 1049 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 70 (1946)) 
(omitted from the U.S. Code when the Indian Claims Commission terminated in 1978). 
 206. Id. § 2, 60 Stat. at 1050. 
 207. Id. 
 208. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 38, at 132. 
 209. Congress cut funding for Indian programs during World War II. Id. at 140.  During 
the 1950s, a movement emerged aimed at terminating the special status of Indian tribes to 
remove what its proponents believed were barriers to Indian assimilation into white society. 
Id. at 141.  Many Indians migrated to urban areas like Chicago or Los Angeles. Id. at 148. 
 210. Id. at 149. 
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Johnson’s “War on Poverty” programs further encouraged the development 
of Indian self-determination.211  Indians benefited from programs 
emphasizing local control, and tribes began to provide their own social 
services and schools for their members.212  The federal Office of Economic 
Opportunity also supported on-reservation legal aid and studies which 
revealed substantial disparities between Indians and non-Indians in health, 
education, and social welfare.213
President Richard Nixon’s administration “formal[ly] inaugurat[ed]” 
Indian self-determination.
 
214  On July 8, 1970, President Nixon delivered a 
Special Message on Indian Affairs to Congress.215  The President rejected 
the federal government’s role as a trustee toward Indian tribes that could 
break its tie with the tribes unilaterally.216  Instead, the President stated that 
“[t]he special relationship between Indians and the Federal government is 
the result . . . of solemn obligations which have been entered into by the 
United States . . . through written treaties and through formal and informal 
agreements . . . .”217  The President went on to indicate his view that the 
new goal of federal Indian policy must be “to strengthen the Indian’s sense 
of autonomy without threatening his sense of community.  We must assure 
the Indian that he can assume control of his own life without being 
separated involuntarily from the tribal group. . . . [and] without being cut 
off from Federal concern and Federal support.”218  Nixon also emphasized 
that Indians should be the leaders developing this policy.219  Subsequent 
presidents have reaffirmed the federal government’s responsibility to 
operate in a “sensitive manner respectful of tribal sovereignty. . . . within a 
government-to-government relationship with federally recognized Native 
American tribes.”220
In accordance with the ideas put forward by the Nixon administration, 
Congress, in 1975, passed the Indian Self-Determination and Education 
Assistance Act (ISDEA).
 
221  The Act underlined a “firm federal policy of 
promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic development.”222
 
 211. Kunesh, supra note 
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 215. Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, 213 PUB. PAPERS 564 (July 8, 
1970). 
 216. Id. at 567. 
 217. Id. at 565. 
 218. Id. at 566–67. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Memorandum on Government-to-Government Relations with Native American 
Tribal Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (May 4, 1994); see also Memorandum on Tribal 
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 222. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980); see also 
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legislation allows tribes to enter into contracts with the federal government 
so they may take control over the administration of federal programs for the 
health, education, and welfare of Indians.223  Several other statutes 
enhanced tribal control over on-reservation housing development224 and 
provided funding for tribal education projects, especially, for example, 
tribally-controlled colleges or universities.225
Today, government-to-government respect is a cornerstone goal of self-
determination.  The federal government has attempted to give equal weight 
to concerns about independence and support for Indian tribes.  This self-
determination policy defines the relationship between the federal 
government and Indians, but questions about where exactly the balance tilts 
during the changing political climate remain. 
 
II.  A MODERN-DAY JURISDICTIONAL BATTLEGROUND:  STATE TAXATION 
OF CIGARETTE SALES TO NON-INDIANS ON RESERVATION LAND 
This part introduces the modern controversy which has entangled the 
states, the tribes, and the federal government for several decades.  First, this 
part discusses the line of Supreme Court cases leading to their decision in 
Attea which established a set of general boundaries without crafting a 
definitive solution.226  This part proceeds to discuss New York State’s 
enactment of a scheme taxing transactions with non-Indians on 
reservations227 and the Attea decisions in New York State courts.228  This 
part then examines the Supreme Court’s decision in Attea.229  Next, this 
part focuses on the conflict and confusion in the decade following Attea and 
the renewal of the conflict when the New York State legislature enacted a 
new tax scheme in 2010.230  Finally, this part offers a parallel story by 
examining Washington State’s successful solution to its analogous 
problem.231
State taxation of transactions with non-Indians on reservation land is an 
arena where the competing interests of the state, the tribes, and the federal 





Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEA) as an example of “the 
congressional goal of Indian self-government” which has an “‘overriding goal’ of 
encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development” (quoting New Mexico v. 
Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334–35 (1983)). 
  Indian tribes have a clear interest in developing their 
 223. 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a)(1); ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 38, at 153; Rebecca Anita 
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 224. Native American Housing Assistance Self-Determination Act, 25 U.S.C. § 4101. 
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 228. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 229. See infra Part II.B. 
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economies and in the revenue they gain from doing business with non-
Indians who come to tribal territory.  Lastly, the federal government has an 
interest in promoting tribal self-determination and preventing states from 
interfering with its power to regulate tribal affairs.233
A.  A Prelude to Attea 
  These interests thus 
forced the Supreme Court to engage in a complex balancing act. 
First, this section describes the line of Supreme Court cases which set the 
stage for the Court’s decision in Attea.234  This section then discusses the 
New York legislation enacted in the aftermath of these cases, attempting to 
tax cigarette sales to non-Indians on reservation land.235  Finally, this 
section examines the Attea decisions in the New York State courts.236
1.  Delineating Without Deciding:  From Warren to Potawatomi 
 
Beginning in the mid-1960s and continuing for the next three decades, 
the Supreme Court attempted to formally delineate the boundaries of the 
states’ taxation authority over Indian activities.  Perhaps motivated by the 
goals of the Indian New Deal and the corresponding promotion of Indian 
self-determination and tribal sovereignty, the Court attempted to create a 
framework through which a state’s involvement in tribal enterprise could be 
measured. 
In 1965, Justice Hugo Black delivered the Court’s unanimous decision in 
Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission.237  There, the 
appellant, Warren Trading Post Company, was licensed by the U.S. 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs as a retail trader on the Arizona-located 
portion of the Navajo Indian Reservation.238  Arizona levied a two percent 
tax on Warren’s gross income.239  Warren claimed that this tax, as applied 
to the income derived from its Indian reservation business, was 
unconstitutional under the Indian Commerce Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution and “inconsistent with the comprehensive congressional plan 
. . . to regulate Indian trade and traders and to have Indian tribes on 
reservations govern themselves.”240  The Arizona Supreme Court upheld 
the tax; the Supreme Court reversed, finding the tax preempted by federal 
regulation.241  Because the Court decided the case on this issue, it did not 
reach the issue of whether the Indian Commerce Clause barred the tax.242
The Court began its discussion by reiterating Chief Justice Marshall’s 
words from Worcester:  Indian treaties with the United States contemplated 
 
 
 233. See id. at 142–43; see also supra Part I.C.1–2. 
 234. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 235. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 236. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 237. 380 U.S. 685 (1965). 
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tribal territory as separate from that of the states, giving the federal 
government exclusive dealings with the tribes.243  Justice Black continued 
to outline the history of federal regulations of Indians, including the Trade 
and Intercourse Act of 1790.244  The Court stated that “[s]uch 
comprehensive federal regulation of Indian traders has continued from that 
day to this.”245  Under these “apparently all-inclusive regulations,” the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs licensed Warren Trading Post to do 
business with the Navajo tribe.246  The Court concluded that such extensive 
regulations and legislation “would seem in themselves sufficient to show 
that Congress has taken the business of Indian trading on reservations so 
full in hand that no room remains for state laws imposing additional 
burdens upon traders.”247
The Court also considered the particular history of the Navajo 
Reservation, noting that since its founding in the nineteenth century, the 
tribe had run its affairs without state interference, “which has automatically 
relieved Arizona of all burdens for carrying on those same 
responsibilities.”
 
248  Thus, the tax would substantially frustrate the 
exclusively federal oversight of Indian trade.249  Additionally, the tax 
would burden traders like Warren and its Indian consumers, disturbing 
federal control and protection against fraud or unfairness.250  Because 
“federal legislation has left the State with no duties or responsibilities 
respecting the reservation Indians,” the Court ruled that the state could not 
levy such a tax against a federally licensed Indian trader’s sales to 
reservation Indians.251
Five years after Warren, the Supreme Court “once again [had] to 
reconcile the plenary power of the States over residents within their borders 
with the semi-autonomous status of Indians living on tribal reservations.”
 
252  
In McClanahan, Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, 
engaged in a similar analysis to that of Justice Black’s in Warren, this time 
analyzing the legitimacy of Arizona’s personal income tax on Rosalind 
McClanahan, a Navajo reservation Indian whose income came solely from 
her work on the Navajo Reservation.253  The Court held that the tax was an 
impermissible state interference into fields established by federal statutes, 
regulations, and Indian treaties as “the exclusive province of the Federal 
Government and the Indians themselves.”254
 
 243. Id. at 688 (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 556–57 (1832)). 
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 249. Id. at 690–91. 
 250. Id. at 691. 
 251. Id. at 691–92. 
 252. McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973). 
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Justice Marshall began his analysis with “a brief statement of what this 
case [did] not involve.”255  The Court limited its decision to those Indians 
living on reservations who “possess the usual accoutrements of tribal self-
government.”256  Thus, the Court placed its analysis within the framework 
of principles of tribal sovereignty rather than making a statement about the 
individual rights of Indians by virtue of their native ancestry.  Neither did 
the holding reach the activity of reservation Indians on non-reservation 
lands.257  More importantly, however, the Court carved out the issue of 
state sovereignty over non-Indians involved in activity on Indian 
reservations as an additional exception to its holding, an issue which would 
form the basis of later decisions central to this controversy.258
Justice Marshall then proceeded, like Justice Black did in Warren, to 
examine the history of federal and state interaction with Indian affairs.
 
259  
The Court then stated that the doctrine of tribal sovereignty and the 
corresponding issue of the state’s permitted interference have evolved 
considerably since Worcester: “[N]otions of Indian sovereignty have been 
adjusted to take account of the State’s legitimate interests in regulating the 
affairs of non-Indians.”260  Thus, when determining the legitimacy of such 
state regulation, “the trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian 
sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal pre-
emption.”261  Relevant treaties and statutes delineate the boundaries of the 
State’s regulatory power.262  Indian sovereignty is still important “because 
it provides a backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal 
statutes must be read.”263
The Court held that the treaties between the U.S. government and the 
Navajo nation preempted the application of Arizona’s personal income tax 
to McClanahan.
 
264  The McClanahan Court followed the Warren Court’s 
interpretation of the federal Navajo treaty, reading it “to preclude extension 
of state law—including state tax law—to Indians on the Navajo 
Reservation.”265  Arizona could not claim it possessed a legitimate interest 
to apply its tax to the income of reservation Indians.266
On the same day it decided McClanahan, the Court also decided a 
companion case, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones.
 
267  There the Court, 
with Justice Byron White writing for the majority,268
 
 255. Id. at 167. 
 decided whether a 
 256. Id. at 167–68. 
 257. Id. at 168. 
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New Mexico tax on the gross receipts of a ski resort owned by the 
Mescalero Apache tribe and located on non-reservation land and a use tax 
on certain ski lifts bought out of state for the resort were permissible.269  
The Court explicitly rejected the tribe’s articulation of the exclusive federal 
jurisdiction over Indian affairs taken from Worcester.270  It stated that 
“[g]eneralizations on this subject have become particularly treacherous.”271  
The Court reiterated McClanahan’s holding that “in the special area of state 
taxation, absent cession of jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it, 
there has been no satisfactory authority for taxing Indian reservation lands 
or Indian income from activities carried on within the boundaries of the 
reservation.”272  However, the taxed activity in Mescalero occurred off the 
Mescalero Apache reservation.273  Contrary to the analysis of state taxation 
of on-reservation activity, “[a]bsent express federal law to the contrary, 
Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held 
subject to nondiscriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of 
the State.”274  The Court held that the IRA did not prohibit state income 
taxation of off-reservation tribal enterprises.275
However, the Court found the tax on the ski lifts impermissible.
 
276  The 
Court deemed the lifts part of the tribe’s property and the “use of permanent 
improvements upon land is so intimately connected with use of the land 
itself that an explicit provision relieving the latter of state tax burdens must 
be construed to encompass an exemption for the former.”277  Because the 
IRA prohibited such a property tax, New Mexico could not extend its 
taxation authority in this manner.278
Although the Court in Warren and McClanahan seemingly endorsed a 
broad limitation on the state taxation of Indian traders and persons, it 
qualified these assertions when it decided Moe v. Confederated Salish & 
Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation.
 
279  There, the Court ruled that 
Montana could impose sales taxes on tobacco products sold on Indian 
reservations to non-Indian purchasers who would otherwise bear the 
ultimate tax burden.280
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice William Rehnquist began by 
outlining the history of the Flathead reservation of the confederated Salish 
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leased tracts of reservation land on which he operated a retail tobacco 
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store.282  Wheeler and one of his Indian employees were arrested by 
Montana deputy sheriffs for two misdemeanors:  selling non-tax-stamped 
cigarettes and failing to possess cigarette retailer licenses.283  Wheeler, his 
employee, the tribe, and the tribal chairmen, sued in federal court for 
“declaratory and injunctive relief against the State’s cigarette tax and 
vendor-licensing statutes as applied to tribal members who sold cigarettes 
within the reservation.”284  The U.S. District Court for the District of 
Montana ruled that Montana could not levy its cigarettes taxes on tribal 
cigarette retailers but it may “require a precollection of the tax imposed by 
law upon the non-Indian purchaser of the cigarettes.”285  The State directly 
appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the district court’s 
judgment.286
The tribe argued that Montana could not impose its cigarette tax on sales 
from Indians to non-Indians.
 
287
Since nonpayment of the tax is a misdemeanor as to the retail purchaser 
[under the Montana statute], the competitive advantage which the Indian 
seller doing business on tribal land enjoys over all other cigarette retailers, 
within and without the reservation, is dependent on the extent to which 
the non-Indian purchaser is willing to flout his legal obligation to pay the 
tax.
  The Court rejected this argument, holding: 
288
The Court distinguished Warren, stating that the tax there, a gross income 
tax imposed directly on the seller, was different from the tax at issue, which 
placed the tax on the non-Indian purchaser rather than the Indian retailer.
 
289  
Montana may require “the Indian tribal seller [to] collect a tax validly 
imposed on non-Indians” because it is “a minimal burden designed to avoid 
the likelihood that in its absence non-Indians purchasing from the tribal 
seller will avoid payment of a concededly lawful tax.”290  The Court found 
“nothing in this burden which frustrates tribal self-government, or runs 
afoul of any congressional enactment dealing with the affairs of reservation 
Indians.”291
Although Justice Rehnquist analyzed the relevant federal treaties and 
statutes (following Justice Marshall’s analysis in McClanahan), the 
discussion of tribal sovereignty in McClanahan and Mescalero as a relevant 
background principle guiding the Court’s jurisprudence does not appear in 
Moe.  In this respect, the Court established an important boundary:  where 
the taxation of non-Indian purchases on reservation lands are concerned, the 
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Court’s jurisprudence is different.  States have a legitimate interest in the 
taxation of non-Indians, and perhaps that interest makes the background of 
tribal sovereignty less important in the balance.  Moe thus set a vague 
precedent for both state taxation authorities and the tribes.  Neither had 
guidance as to what each owed each other.  Indian retailers had to collect 
state taxes against non-Indian purchasers, but just how much the state could 
burden the tribe with enforcing its laws was unclear. 
The Supreme Court in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville 
Indian Reservation292 attempted to clarify this issue.  There, the Court 
considered “whether an Indian tribe ousts a State from any power to tax on-
reservation purchases by nonmembers of the tribe by imposing its own tax 
on the transaction or by otherwise earning revenues from the tribal 
business.”293  Several Indian tribes in Washington State challenged the 
application of Washington’s tax on tobacco products on reservation tobacco 
outlets.294  The tribes sought a preliminary injunction against the 
challenged tax’s enforcement, especially against the seizure of untaxed 
cigarettes bound for delivery to the reservations.295
The Washington tax required dealers to sell only tax-stamped 
cigarettes.
 
296  The tax provided that “Indian tribes are permitted to possess 
unstamped cigarettes for purposes of resale to members of the tribe, but are 
required by regulation to collect the tax with respect to sales to 
nonmembers.”297  As in Moe, the reservation retailers derived a majority of 
their business from non-Indian purchasers coming to the reservation to take 
advantage of the tribes’ tax-exempt status.298  Thus, it is not surprising that 
the Court began its analysis of the issue presented by reiterating its holding 
in Moe.299  Justice White distilled Moe to three succinct principles:  (1) 
states “may sometimes impose a nondiscriminatory tax on non-Indian 
customers of Indian retailers doing business on the reservation,” (2) this 
type of tax “may be valid even if it seriously disadvantages or eliminates 
the Indian retailer’s business with non-Indians,” and (3) states “may impose 
at least ‘minimal’ burdens on the Indian retailer to aid in enforcing and 
collecting the tax.”300
The Court, however, also noted that Moe did not definitively resolve the 
issue.
 
301  In Colville, the tribes levied their own taxes upon the cigarettes 
sold on their reservations and also acted as retailers or wholesalers.302
 
 292. 447 U.S. 134 (1980). 
  
Also, Washington required the tribes to keep detailed records of cigarette 
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sales and precollect the state tax.303  Moe additionally did not discuss any 
problems of enforcement coming from “distinctions between exempt and 
nonexempt purchasers.”304
The Court first affirmed the tribes’ right to impose their own cigarette 
taxes as “a fundamental attribute of [tribal] sovereignty.”
 
305  This 
sovereignty “is dependent on, and subordinate to, only the Federal 
Government, not the States.”306  Justice White then turned to the tribes’ 
economic argument:  if the tribes were to collect the state tax on top of their 
tribal taxes, their businesses would be at a “competitive disadvantage.”307
The Court rejected the tribes’ assertion that federal Indian law preempted 
Washington’s taxes.
 
308  It explained that “[t]he principle of tribal self-
government, grounded in notions of inherent sovereignty and in 
congressional policies, seeks an accommodation between the interests of 
the Tribes and the Federal Government, on the one hand, and those of the 
State, on the other.”309  The Court analyzed these interests through a 
balancing test.310  The tribes’ interests are greatest when raising revenues 
“derived from value generated on the reservation by activities involving the 
Tribes and when the taxpayer is the recipient of tribal services.”311  The 
state’s interest in raising revenue is strongest when “the tax is directed at 
off-reservation value and when the taxpayer is the recipient of state 
services.”312  Because the tax applied to non-Indian purchasers who did not 
receive tribal services, Washington’s interest was particularly strong.313
The Washington tax’s collection burden was “legally indistinguishable” 
from Montana’s tax in Moe.
 
314  The Court thus held that the State may 
require tribal cigarette shops to “affix tax stamps purchased from the State 
to individual packages of cigarettes prior to the time of sale to nonmembers 
of the Tribe.”315  The Court also held the State’s recordkeeping 
requirements valid for both taxed and untaxed sales as the tribes did not 
meet their burden to demonstrate that “recordkeeping requirements for 
exempt sales are not reasonably necessary as a means of preventing 
fraudulent transactions.”316
The Court further held that Washington could permissibly tax Indian 
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services, “those Indians stand on the same footing as non-Indians.”318  
Thus, the State’s interest in regulating the transactions of these individuals 
“outweighs any tribal interest that may exist in preventing the State from 
imposing its taxes.”319  Washington’s interest was also great enough to 
justify the seizures of unstamped cigarettes destined for tribal sales.320  
However, the Court noted,“[i]t is significant that these seizures take place 
outside the reservation, in locations where state power over Indian affairs is 
considerably more expansive than it is within reservation boundaries.”321  
Although Washington argued that it could seize cigarettes on reservation 
land, the Court declined to express an opinion on this obviously politically 
controversial question as it was not properly before it.322
Thus, the Colville Court attempted to clarify the principles set forth in 
Moe, but without going further than the facts necessitated.  Rather than 
articulate broad boundaries for the state and the tribes, the Court’s decision 
seemed to imply that it would treat state taxation of cigarettes sold to non-
Indians on Indian reservations on a case-by-case basis.  Thus, Colville 
strengthened the Court’s past precedent without providing a workable 
framework for the future, most importantly in the area of enforcement. 
 
Seventeen days after deciding Colville, the Supreme Court issued its 
decision in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,323 in which Justice 
Marshall wrote the opinion of a divided Court.324  There, Arizona sought to 
impose fuel taxes on the petitioner, Pinetop Logging Company (Pinetop).325  
Pinetop was a non-Indian enterprise only operating on the Fort Apache 
Indian Reservation in Arizona.326  The Tribe and Pinetop argued that 
federal law preempted such taxes; the Supreme Court agreed, reversing the 
decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals.327
The Court recognized that logging timber on Indian reservation land was 
an activity extensively regulated by the federal government.
 
328  Such timber 
“is owned by the United States for the benefit of the Tribe and cannot be 
harvested for sale without the consent of Congress.”329  Thus, Pinetop’s 
activities were subject to federal control.330
Justice Marshall began his analysis by stating that the Court’s prior 
decisions “establish several basic principles with respect to the boundaries 
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However, “there is no rigid rule by which to resolve the question whether a 
particular state law may be applied to an Indian reservation or to tribal 
members.”332  Congressional authority under the Indian Commerce Clause 
and the unique position of the Indian tribes “have given rise to two 
independent but related barriers to the assertion of state regulatory authority 
over tribal reservations and members.”333
First, the Court reiterated that the exercise of state regulatory authority 
“may be pre-empted by federal law,” citing Warren and McClanahan as 
examples.
 
334  Second, such state regulation “may unlawfully infringe ‘on 
the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by 
them.’”335  These barriers are independent because they may each provide a 
“sufficient basis for holding state law inapplicable to activity undertaken on 
the reservation.”336  Ultimately tribal sovereignty is subject to the review of 
Congress; however, the Court reiterated, “traditional notions of Indian self-
government . . . have provided an important ‘backdrop’ against which 
vague or ambiguous federal enactments must always be measured.”337
The Court then articulated a balancing test between state interests and 
federal control.
 
338  The state’s interest in regulating the on-reservation 
conduct of tribal Indians “is likely to be minimal and the federal interest in 
encouraging tribal self-government is at its strongest.”339  The “[m]ore 
difficult question[]” is non-Indian activity on Indian reservations.340  There, 
Justice Marshall stated that the inquiry begins with an examination of 
“relevant federal treaties and statutes in terms of both the broad policies that 
underlie them and the notions of sovereignty that have developed from 
historical traditions of tribal independence.”341  He also noted that the 
“inquiry is not dependent on mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or 
tribal sovereignty, but has called for a particularized inquiry into the nature 
of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake.”342
Using this model, the Court examined the facts and found the federal 
regulation of timber on the White Mountain Apache reservation 
comprehensive.
  Such a balancing 
calculus would be specific to the facts of the case before the Court; the 
Court did not delineate the boundaries of these three conflicting spheres of 
regulation and jurisdiction. 
343  The Court held that “the federal regulatory scheme is so 
pervasive as to preclude the additional burdens sought to be imposed in this 
case.”344
 
 332. Id. at 142. 
  Thus, there was “no room” for the State’s taxes in this scheme, 
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and their imposition would interfere with federal regulatory power.345  
Arizona failed to “identify a legitimate regulatory interest” in the taxes 
beyond “a general desire to raise revenue.”346  The Court could not identify 
“a responsibility or service that justifies the assertion of taxes imposed for 
on-reservation operations.”347  The Court held the exercise of state 
authority impermissible “where a number of the policies underlying the 
federal regulatory scheme are threatened by the taxes respondents seek to 
impose, and where respondents are unable to justify the taxes except in 
terms of a generalized interest in raising revenue.”348
The Court returned to the issue of on-reservation cigarette sales in 
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of 
Oklahoma.
 
349  There, the Court, with Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for 
the majority, held that “under the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, the 
State may not tax such sales to Indians, but remains free to collect taxes on 
sales to nonmembers of the tribe.”350
The Potawatomi tribe owned and operated a convenience store selling 
cigarettes on its lands.
 
351  In 1987, the Oklahoma Tax Commission served 
the tribe with an assessment letter for $2.7 million in taxes that the tribe did 
not collect between 1982 and 1986.352  The tribe filed suit in federal court 
to enjoin the assessment.353  The U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Oklahoma held that Oklahoma “lacked the authority to tax the 
on-reservation cigarette sales to tribal members or to tax the Tribe 
directly.”354  However, the State could require the tribe to precollect taxes 
for on-reservation sales to non-Indians.355  The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that “Oklahoma lacked the authority to 
impose a tax on any sales that occur on the reservation, regardless of 
whether they are to tribesmen or nonmembers.”356  The Supreme Court thus 
explained that it “granted certiorari to resolve an apparent conflict with this 
Court’s precedents and to clarify the law of sovereign immunity with 
respect to the collection of sales taxes on Indian lands.”357
Chief Justice Rehnquist began his analysis by quoting Chief Justice 
Marshall in Cherokee Nation:  “Indian tribes are ‘domestic dependent 





 345. Id. 
  The State argued that tribal sovereign immunity 
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restricted to the internal affairs of the tribe.359  The Court rejected this 
argument, citing congressional approval of the immunity doctrine.360  Thus, 
the Court was loath “to modify the long-established principle of tribal 
sovereign immunity.”361  However, the doctrine “does not excuse a tribe 
from all obligations to assist in the collection of validly imposed state sales 
taxes.”362  Thus, the Court held that Moe and Colville governed its 
conclusion:  the State may tax on-reservation cigarette sales to non-
Indians.363  However, tribal sovereign immunity still barred the State from 
suing the tribe to enforce its taxes.364
2.  New York Responds:  The 1988 Scheme 
 
In the wake of Moe, New York attempted to create a scheme to collect 
taxes from on-reservation sales of cigarettes to non-Indian purchasers.365  In 
1988, the Department of Taxation and Finance created regulations (1988 
Regulations) that adopted a “‘probable demand’ mechanism that limited the 
quantity of un-stamped—i.e., ‘untaxed’—cigarettes that wholesalers or 
distributors could sell to tribes and tribal retailers.”366  The State would 
base this probable demand quota on its own projection or based on 
negotiations with tribal leaders.367  Based on this probable demand, the 
State would then issue tax exemption coupons to Indian retailers 
representing their monthly allotment.368
3.  Attea in State Court 
 
Milhelm Attea Bros., Inc., cigarette wholesalers whose business 
primarily relied on Indian trade, immediately challenged the validity of this 
scheme.369  Attea used reasoning similar to that in Warren and Bracker and 
contended that federal regulation of Indian traders was so comprehensive as 
to preclude the State’s imposition of such regulations.370
 
 359. Id. at 510. 
  They argued that 
federal statutes controlling Indian trade preempted the State’s 
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regulations.371  The Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs authorized the 
wholesalers to sell cigarettes to Indians on reservations under 25 U.S.C. 
§ 261 (2006).372  This statute, first enacted in 1876, specified that “[t]he 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall have the sole power and authority to 
appoint traders to the Indian tribes and to make such rules and . . . 
specifying the kind and quantity of goods and the prices at which such 
goods shall be sold to the Indians.”373  The New York Appellate Division 
initially agreed with the wholesalers; however, the U.S. Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and remanded the case in light of its decision in 
Potawatomi.374  On July 9, 1992, the Appellate Division held New York’s 
tax scheme not preempted by 25 U.S.C. § 261 and thus constitutional.375
The Appellate Division’s decision sparked Seneca Nation retaliation.  
Protestors blocked the New York State Thruway passing through Seneca 
reservation land.
 
376  A week after the decision, on July 16, 1992, protesters 
burned tires on the I-90 New York State Thruway located on Seneca 
territory.377  The protest initially began as a method to promote awareness 
of the hundreds of Seneca jobs at stake in the cigarette commerce.378  The 
protest, however, quickly escalated as some Senecas began to light tires and 
even throw debris off of the Thruway running through the Senecas’ 
Cattaraugus reservation.379  A violent confrontation ensued in which 
Seneca Indians and state troopers were injured.380  Only after the New York 
Court of Appeals issued an injunction on July 17 barring the enforcement of 
the tax scheme did the demonstration cease.381
In its decision, the New York Court of Appeals distinguished Moe and 
Colville, arguing that “those cases involved the regulation of sales to non-
Indian consumers” and “this case was significantly different because New 
York’s regulations apply to sales by non-Indian wholesalers to reservation 
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Indians.”382  The Court of Appeals, using Warren, concluded the federal 
regulations embodied in 25 U.S.C. § 261 “deprived the States of all power 
to impose regulatory burdens on licensed Indian traders.”383  The Warren 
Court found these regulations “apparently all-inclusive” and “would seem 
in themselves sufficient to show that Congress has taken the business of 
Indian trading on reservations so fully in hand that no room remains for 
state laws imposing additional burdens upon traders.”384  The Supreme 
Court disagreed with this interpretation.385
B.  Attea in the Supreme Court 
 
Justice Stevens wrote the opinion of the Supreme Court in Attea deciding 
whether New York’s regulations were “pre-empted by federal statutes 
governing trade with Indians,” namely 25 U.S.C. § 261.386  The Court 
reiterated Moe, stating that “[b]ecause New York lacks authority to tax 
cigarettes sold to tribal members for their own consumption cigarettes to be 
consumed on the reservation by enrolled tribal members are tax exempt and 
need not be stamped.”387  The New York Taxation Department 
(Department) “determined that a large volume of unstamped cigarettes was 
being purchased by non-Indians from reservation retailers.”388  To prevent 
nonexempt purchasers from escaping taxation, “the regulations limit the 
quantity of untaxed cigarettes that wholesalers may sell to tribes and tribal 
retailers.”389
The regulations mandated two ways to develop and enforce such 
limitations:  agreements between the State and the tribe or, “[i]n the absence 
of such an agreement . . . the Department itself limits the permitted quantity 
of untaxed cigarettes based on the ‘probable demand’ of tax-exempt Indian 
consumers.”
 
390  The Department would calculate “probable demand” by 
either relying on tribal evidence if the tribe regulates or controls on-
reservation cigarette sales or through its own calculus.391  “Each sale of 
untaxed cigarettes by a wholesaler to a tribe or reservation retailer must be 
approved by the Department . . . . Retailers are sent ‘Tax Exemption 
Coupons’ entitling them to their monthly allotment of tax-exempt 
cigarettes.”392
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may cancel the exemption certificates of noncomplying tribes or 
retailers.”393
Justice Stevens first noted that the Court’s opinion was based on a facial 
challenge to the New York scheme.
 
394  Thus, the Court made important 
assumptions.  It assumed “the allocations for each reservation will be 
sufficiently generous to satisfy the legitimate demands of those reservation 
Indians who smoke cigarettes.”395  The Court noted it confined its decision 
“to those alleged defects that inhere in the regulations as written.”396  
Although the effects of the scheme “may be relevant . . . this case does not 
require us to assess for all purposes each feature of New York’s tax 
enforcement scheme that might affect tribal self-government or federal 
authority over Indian affairs.”397  The Court thus was hesitant to expand its 
holding beyond “the narrower question whether the New York scheme is 
inconsistent with [section 261].”398
The Court stated that later cases such as Moe limited the broad language 
of Warren, which stated that section 261 preempted state interference.
 
399  
The tax in Moe “fell upon a class—non-Indians—whom the State had 
power to tax.”400  The Court also reiterated its findings in Colville, namely 
that “the Tribes had failed to meet their burden of showing that the 
recordkeeping requirements . . . were ‘not reasonably necessary as a means 
of preventing fraudulent transactions.’”401
After reviewing this line of antecedent questions, the Court undertook to 
balance the state’s interest in regulating the activities of the people within 
its borders and the tribal autonomy of Indian tribes living on 
reservations.
 
402  The Court rearticulated its analysis in Bracker:  this is a 
conflict whose resolution does not depend on rigid concepts but instead a 
particularized inquiry into the facts.403
The Court, following its precedent, reasoned that the state’s “valid 
interest in ensuring compliance with lawful taxes . . . leaves more room for 
state regulation than in others.”
  Thus, in addition to Justice 
Stevens’s initial warning that the Court’s decision would be limited to a 
facial challenge of the statutes as written, the Court further limited its 
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the collection of valid taxes from non-Indians.”405  Thus, “[25 U.S.C. § 261 
does] not bar the States from imposing reasonable regulatory burdens upon 
Indian traders.”406  The Court held that “Indian traders are not wholly 
immune from state regulation that is reasonably necessary to the assessment 
or collection of lawful state taxes.”407
Next, the Court assessed the New York Court of Appeals’s alternative 
holding:  even if Indian traders may be burdened by state regulations, the 
regulations at issue are excessively burdensome.
 
408  The respondents 
objected to the New York scheme’s “probable demand” calculations.409  
The Court replied:  “While the possibility of an inadequate quota may 
provide the basis for a future challenge to the application of the regulations, 
we are unwilling to assume, in the absence of any such showing by 
respondents, that New York will underestimate the legitimate demand for 
tax-free cigarettes.”410
The Court thus did not determine whether such mechanisms are always 
constitutional.  Indeed, by admitting possible future problems with the 
scheme’s application, the Court abstained from creating a broad framework 
for the State, and instead decided a narrow, fact-specific, facial challenge.  
The Court ruled that the “procedure should not prove unduly burdensome 
absent wrongful withholding or delay of approval—problems that can be 
addressed if and when they arise.”
 
411  The Court assessed the New York 
scheme’s precollection requirement similarly:  “Again assuming that the 
‘probable demand’ calculations leave ample room for legitimately tax-
exempt sales, the precollection regime will not require prepayment of any 
tax to which New York is not entitled.”412  The Court also did not assume 
“the Department would refuse certification to any federally authorized 
trader or stultify tribal economies by refusing certification to new 
reservation retailers.”413  It accepted the State’s assurances that such 
approval is “virtually automatic.”414
The U.S. Solicitor General submitted an amicus brief asking for the 
Court to affirm the decision of the New York Court of Appeals.
 
415  The 
United States opposed the scheme’s creation of “trade territories” and the 
allocation of “each reservation’s overall quota among its retail outlets.”416  
The Court shared these concerns, warning that “[d]epending upon how they 
are applied in particular circumstances, these provisions may present 
significant problems to be addressed in some future proceeding.”417
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Court recommended that “[a]greements between the Department and 
individual tribes might avoid or resolve problems that are now purely 
hypothetical.”418  With this admonition and appeal for an agreement 
between the parties, the Court concluded that the scheme did not facially 
violate § 261.419
1.  A Hollow Victory:  Post-Attea Conflict and Forbearance 
 
Although hailed as a “major victory” for the state of New York,420 nearly 
two decades of conflict and confusion post-Attea demonstrate its failure to 
create a resolution to New York’s enforcement problem.  After the decision, 
the Department planned to begin collection of taxes,  however, enforcement 
of the regulations was delayed to “finalize the plan’s technical details.”421  
The Department initiated negotiations with the tribes, but ultimately 
failed.422  In December 1995, Tax Commissioner Michael Urbach stated 
that New York intended to enforce the tax scheme in February 1996 upon 
the expiration of older tax regulations.423  By late February 1996, the 
Department announced that enforcement of the tax scheme would occur, 
beginning on July 5, 1996.424  Tribal leaders responded with a summit 
attended by over 200 Indian officials, stating that tribes intended to fight the 
State’s enforcement plan.425
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George Pataki lifted the July enforcement deadline.426  In April 1997, after 
a stalemate between the negotiating tribes and the State, Governor Pataki 
announced an interim compromise agreement where reservations would 
impose their own taxes on cigarettes which would be lower than New York 
State taxes.427  The Onondaga, Oneida, Tuscarora, and Cayuga Nations 
agreed to the compromise.428  However, the four tribes with the largest 
share of the reservation cigarette trade, the Senecas, the St. Regis Mohawk, 
the Shinnecock, and the Poospatuck refused to agree.429  The Department 
ordered all shipments of cigarettes to the disagreeing tribes to cease and 
arrested two truck drivers on felony violations of the tax regulations.430
The Seneca Nation responded to the State’s aggressive enforcement with 
a repetition of its 1992 blockade.  The Senecas shut down a thirty mile 
stretch of the New York Thruway passing through its Cattaraugus 
reservation on April 21, 1997.
 
431  State troopers clashed with the protesters, 
injuring individuals on both sides.432  The State agreed to remove its 
troopers from the Seneca reservation, and the Senecas agreed to further 
negotiations.433  However, the talks broke down after only two days.434  On 
May 22, 1997, Governor Pataki announced that the State would no longer 
attempt to enforce the tax scheme and instead announced a permanent 
forbearance policy against the enforcement of the tax.435  The New York 
legislature repealed the never-implemented 1988 Regulations in April 
1998.436
Despite the policy of forbearance declared by the Governor and affirmed 
by the Department, in 2003 the New York legislature adopted Tax Law 
471-e directing the Department to adopt regulations to tax cigarettes sold on 
reservations to non-Indians.
 
437  The Department drafted, but never adopted 
regulations.438
In 2005, the legislature amended 471-e to incorporate the Department’s 
proposed regulations, stating:  “non-Indians making cigarette purchases on 
an Indian reservation shall not be exempt from paying the cigarette tax 
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when purchasing cigarettes within this state.”439  The 2005 scheme also 
adopted a probable demand calculus and coupon system similar to the 1988 
Regulations.440  The cigarette wholesaler must pay the sales tax on all 
cigarettes and then use the coupon for a refund.  After the passage of these 
amendments, the Department declined to make the probable demand 
calculations or proper implementation rules necessary to enforce them and 
instead continued the forbearance policy.441
In response to the State’s threatened enforcement despite the 
Department’s forbearance policy, a tribal retailer initiated a declaratory 
judgment action against the enforcement of the 471-e amendments.
 
442  The 
Appellate Division concluded that such provisions would only become 
effective when “[a]t a minimum, the actions, rules and regulations 
necessary for the implementation of the statutory scheme include the 
issuance of Indian tax exemption coupons.”443  The court therefore enjoined 
the enforcement of 471-e.444
Thus, when the Court of Appeals decided Cayuga Indian Nation of New 
York v. Gould
 
445 in May 2010, there was “no enforceable statutory or 
regulatory scheme specifically addressing the calculation or collection of 
taxes arising from the on-reservation retail sale of cigarettes.”  There, the 
court ruled that “[i]n the absence of a methodology developed by the State 
that respects the federally protected right to sell untaxed cigarettes to 
members of the Nation while at the same time providing for the calculation 
and collection of the tax relating to retail sales to non-Indian consumers” 
taxes could not be collected on reservation cigarette sales to non-Indians.446  
The court reiterated that New York should create a “specialized 
mechanism” for taxation while proceeding with sensitivity and respect 
towards Native American tribes.447
2.  Crisis Reignites:  The 2010 Scheme 
 
While the Court of Appeals considered the case in Cayuga, the 
Department revoked its previous policy of forbearance.448  On June 21, 
2010, the State Legislature enacted amendments to the tax law, including 
provisions that required all cigarettes sold on Indian reservations in New 
York to bear a New York tax stamp even if those cigarettes are destined for 
tax-exempt sales.449
 
 439. See 2005 N.Y. Sess. Laws 461 (McKinney).  
  It also created an optional tax exemption coupon 
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 441. See Cayuga, 930 N.E.2d at 239. 
 442. Day Wholesale, Inc. v. State, 856 N.Y.S.2d 808, 808 (App. Div. 2008). 
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system.450  The Department adopted an emergency rule on June 22, 2010 to 
enforce these amendments.451  The Department claimed the system satisfied 
the requirements set forth by Cayuga and moved to lift the preliminary 
injunction still in place from the 2008 Day Wholesale litigation.452  So far 
the Appellate Division has not agreed with the State.453
On October 14, 2010, Judge Richard Arcara of the U.S. District Court for 
the Western District of New York granted a stay of enforcement of the 2010 
scheme against the Seneca Nation and the Cayuga Nation pending appeal to 
the Second Circuit.
 
454  The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a 
preliminary injunction.455  However, the court granted plaintiffs a stay 
pending the Second Circuit’s review of their motion.456  The court found 
that the Seneca Nation will suffer “irreparable injury absent a stay . . . that 
cannot be remedied by damages.”457  The court noted that “[a]pproximately 
3,000 people are currently employed by the Seneca Nation’s 172 tobacco 
retailers” and the cigarette sales profits “represent virtually the only source 
of revenue for the [Cayuga] Nation.”458  Judge Arcara thus concluded that 
“[t]he potential loss of an entire economy that currently supports many of 
each Nation’s members and services is a harm that cannot be measured by 
monetary damages alone.”459  If the new tax scheme were to go into effect 
immediately and the Second Circuit later decided it was constitutionally 
impermissible, “it may be too late to undo the harm suffered by the 
Nations’ existing tobacco businesses in the interim.”460
The court also found that New York State will not “suffer substantial 
injury if the stay is issued.”
 
461  The court noted the State’s “dramatic shift” 
from forbearance to enforcement after the State’s recent budgetary crisis 
and concluded, “the Court does not believe that the minimal, additional 
delay pending appeal will cause substantial injury, particularly when 
weighed against the potential irreparable harm to the Nations’ tobacco 
economies.”462
Although in denying the Seneca Nation’s motion for a preliminary 
injunction the court necessarily found that the Nations “failed to 
demonstrate a substantial possibility of success on appeal. . . . [the court 
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not been authorized by Supreme Court precedent.464  It further noted that 
“[i]t remains an open question as to whether the Second Circuit will agree 
with this Court’s determination that the prior approval system imposes only 
a minimal burden” and that the “Nations have raised serious legal questions 
going to the merits of their claims.”465
The court lastly found a stay to be in the public interest.
 
466  Because the 
State and the Indian tribes “have been at odds over this issue for decades” 
and because “both sides publicly spoke about the potential for violence,” 
the court found a stay would retain the status quo until the Seneca Nation’s 
arguments were fully considered.467  The Second Circuit denied the State’s 
motion to lift the District Court’s stay on December 9, 2010.468
C.  A Parallel Path:  The Example of Washington State 
 
While the conflict between the Indian tribes and the State of New York 
continues in the courts, Washington State confronted a similar problem 
after the Supreme Court ruled in its favor in Colville.469  The State Revenue 
Department and the tribes were at an impasse despite Colville, which 
became a “hollow victory” for the state, offering little guidance for a 
solution.470
On August 4, 1989, Washington Governor Booth Gardner and leaders of 
Washington State Indian tribes signed a historic agreement entitled the 
“Centennial Accord.” (Accord)
  Thus, the State embarked on a different path from that of New 
York:  government-to-government talks leading to agreements and 
eventually legislation effectively ending the tribal-state conflict over the 
collection of cigarette taxes. 
471  The “mutual goals” of the parties were 
to improve state-tribal relations and provide a “framework for that 
government-to-government relationship and implementation procedures to 
assure execution of that relationship.”472  The Accord established annual 
meetings to maintain a continuing dialogue between the parties473 and 
expressed mutual respect for the sovereignty of each party.474
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  The Accord 
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marked an important first step in creating a relationship of trust between the 
State Revenue Department and the tribes. 
In 2001, the Washington legislature permitted the governor to enter into 
compacts with Indian tribes over the taxation of cigarettes.475  Certain 
Indian tribes were eligible for such pacts.476  The legislation allowed tribes 
to issue their own taxes on cigarettes; however, such taxes must equal the 
State taxes and revenue from such taxes must go to essential reservation 
government services.477  The legislation was successful:  by 2005, 19 out of 
29 eligible tribes entered into such compacts.478  As a result of these 
compacts, tribal smokeshops in Washington State sell taxed and stamped 
cigarettes and use state-licensed wholesalers.479  According to Leslie 
Cushman, former Deputy Director of Washington’s Department of 
Revenue, the resulting tribal tax arrangements were “[s]uccessful beyond 
[the Department’s] wildest dreams!”480
In late 1999, Washington State affirmed the commitments made in the 
Centennial Accord with the Millennium Agreement.  At the Tribal and 
State Leaders’ Summit in November 1999, Indian nations and Washington 
signed this agreement.
 
481  The tribes and state officials committed to 
strengthening government-to-government communications and promoting 
awareness of tribal sovereignty.482  The parties agreed to continue to work 
together to address areas of mutual concern and to further institutionalize 
their relationship through legislation.483
Twenty years after the Centennial Accord and ten years after the 
Millennium Agreement, Washington State has successfully endeavored to 
resolve its conflict with the Indian tribes through roundtable discussions 
and cigarette compact negotiations.  Both parties have resolved to create a 
relationship where trust can follow and lasting solutions can be forged.
 
484
III.  A MODEST PROPOSAL:  GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT TAX 
COMPACTS 
 
The previous parts of this Note have described an intricate and seemingly 
intractable conflict.  This part, however, proposes a solution which begins 
with a seemingly modest overture of goodwill and partnership.  Although 
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such suggestions may seem simplistic, this Note’s discussion thus far has 
demonstrated that such actions have been sorely lacking in New York State. 
Whereas in Washington State, tribes and state officials are “content to 
discuss persisting disputes around a table and not debate them through 
lawyers in a courtroom,”485 in New York, tribal-state disputes surrounding 
the enforcement of the state tax scheme continue.  Both Washington and 
New York received Supreme Court decisions facially approving each tax 
scheme without providing any framework for enforcement or tribal 
negotiations.  Both states found enforcement of these tax schemes to be 
problematic.  New York responded by announcing a policy of forbearance; 
Washington took affirmative steps to create a lasting protocol of mutual 
respect where conflict resolution can actively take place.  Indeed, by the 
1990s, New York remained the only state that had not entered into tax 
agreements with its Indian tribes.486
After centuries of mutual distrust, New York must assure the Senecas 
that their treaties and tribal sovereignty will be protected and respected by 
the State.  The Senecas have not forgotten the historical, “predatory” efforts 
of the State to infringe their treaty rights.
  New York is suffering from its 
inaction, but it too can create a solution if it follows Washington’s example.  
New York and the Seneca Nation of Indians should engage in government-
to-government negotiations to solve this cigarette crisis. 
487  Without a court ruling 
definitively determining the merits of these treaty rights with regard to this 
controversy,488
The Senecas, on the other hand must put aside threats of tribal unrest
 the State must proceed cognizant of the Seneca 
interpretation and respectful of their position.  The State must display its 
good faith by making the first step towards compromise. 
489 
and make a unilateral commitment to compromise.  Compromise is 
certainly in the best interest of the tribes.  Ongoing litigation is extremely 
costly to the already fragile tribal economies and an unsustainable model 
for resolution of the controversy.  The manifest conflict and confusion 
following a deceptively straightforward U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Attea 
demonstrates that courts have not provided a definitive solution.490  
Furthermore, pursuing out-of-court solutions avoids the zero-sum result of 
adversarial litigation.  The Senecas simply have too much at stake to follow 
such a course of action.491
As Governor Andrew Cuomo forms his gubernatorial administration’s 
Indian policy, he should consider mirroring Washington State Governor 
Gardner’s Centennial Accord.
 
492  Such an accord provides a framework 
from which compacts can be negotiated.493
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recognition of the respective sovereignties of each party in the form of a 
signed accord.494  It thus institutionalizes the mutual respect embodied in a 
relationship between governments.495
Once the parties have created an open dialogue, the State can enter into 
cigarette compacts with each tribe similar to those in Washington.
  The Governor should meet 
personally with tribal leaders and establish a pattern of annual meetings to 
maintain a dialogue.  Such meetings demonstrate that the State respects 
tribal leadership as a co-partner in the compromise process and opens a 
venue for meaningful discussion absent the adversarial posturing of 
litigation.  Furthermore, the establishment of annual meetings shows both 
sides are actually committing to a tribal-state relationship. 
496
The tax department should also develop internal best practices for 
creating cigarette tax compromises.
  
Individualized compacts can specifically address the needs of particular 
tribes.  For example, the solution that fits the Senecas’ situation may not 
function as well for the St. Regis Mohawk.  Individualized compacts also 
leave no ambiguities over whether certain provisions apply to certain tribes. 
497  In Washington, “Department of 
Revenue staff travel[ed] throughout the state” meeting tribal leaders.498  
After these meetings, the department began to view tribal governments as 
partners in tax administration.499
This recognition would give the State more flexibility to compromise.  
New York may then be willing to create a solution where tribal, rather than 
state taxes are levied on reservation sales to non-Indians, like in 
Washington.
  The tax department of New York should 
similarly shift its view of Indian governments from adversaries to partners. 
500  Such a solution would benefit both sides.  From the State’s 
perspective, taxes would still be levied on cigarettes sold on reservations to 
non-Indians.501  From the tribe’s perspective, revenue would go to essential 
tribal government services.502
Additionally, the New York legislature must avoid the policy disconnect 
between the executive branch and the legislative branch that occurred in 
2003.
  The State would still not collect revenue for 
itself; however, this may be solved by compacting for a certain percentage 
of the tax revenue.  Similarly, the tribe might compact for a tax rate lower 
than that of the State to preserve its economy. 
503  The legislature should support any accords or agreements the 
Governor makes with the tribes and enact legislation similar to the 
Washington model.504
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New York State to act uniformly among its branches and agencies.  
Otherwise, any solution would be impermissibly ephemeral, subject to the 
political vicissitudes of New York’s branches of government.  Again, the 
Washington State Legislature understood this when enacting its legislation 
in 2001.505
The success of Washington State in solving its similar situation 
demonstrates that a solution benefiting both parties is possible.  Both parties 
can easily begin this process through talking against a background of 
mutual respect.  The State must cease to view the tribes as an enemy to its 
own interests.  The tribes must similarly begin to view the State as its 
partner in good faith.  Nothing can undo the long history of destruction, 
betrayal, and distrust experienced by the Seneca Nation of Indians and their 
fellow Native Americans.  However, the failure of both parties to create a 
solution to this conflict is certainly not irreversible. 
  It would be wise for New York to do the same. 
CONCLUSION 
State taxation of cigarette sales to non-Indians on reservation land has 
proven a modern battleground where the respective spheres of the state, the 
tribes, and the federal government uncomfortably collide.  In New York 
State, these chaffing jurisdictions have produced a conflict spanning 
decades with roots centuries deep.  However, this conflict does not need to 
last any further into the twenty-first century.  New York State and the 
Seneca Nation of Indians can create a lasting solution if they engage in 
government-to-government negotiations.  New York must initiate a tribal-
state relationship based on mutual respect and recognition and sensitivity to 
the history and treaty rights of the Seneca Nation.  The State must view the 
Senecas as co-partners in tax administration, rather than adversaries bent on 
evasion.  Such a shift opens the door to flexible, individualized compacts 
where the zero-sum result of costly litigation is set aside for more 
permanent solutions based on an investment in a lasting relationship with 
the tribe.  Only when the parties create such a fair, credible, and effective 
solution will this conflict recede into the annals of history. 
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